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The Insider Trading Rules After
Chiarella: Are They Consistent with
Statutory Policy?
By RICHARD J. MORGAN*
Developed in the United States over the past four decades, the fed-
eral insider trading rules prohibit certain persons from trading in the
securities of a corporation or other issuer about which they have mate-
rial information that has not been disclosed. The Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) began the development of the insider
trading rules in 1942, when it adopted rule lOb-5.' This rule, promul-
gated pursuant to authority granted to the SEC by Congress in section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange.Act of 1934,2 has formed the basis for
the proscriptions on insider trading, which have been primarily devel-
oped by the SEC and the federal courts.
This development culminated in 1980 in Chiarella v. United
States,3 in which the United States Supreme Court refused to impose
* Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A., 1967, University of
California, Berkeley; J.D., 1971, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980): "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indi-
rectly, by use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or any
facility of any National Securities Exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." For a discussion of the circumstances under which the
rule was adopted, see note 31 infra.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). Section 10(b) prohibits the use "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security [of] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe. .. ."
3. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). For commentary regarding the Supreme Court and Second
Circuit decisions in Chiarella, see Anderson, Fraud, Fiduciaries, and Insider Trading, 10
HOFSTRA L. REv. 341 (1982); Barry, The Economics of Outside Information andRule 10b-5,
129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Barry]; Branson, Discourse on the
Supreme Court Approach to SEC Rule 10b-5 and Insider Trading, 30 EMORY L.J. 263 (1981);
Dooley, Enforcement ofInsider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980); Heller, Chiarel-
la, SEC Rule 14e-3 and Dirks: Fairness versus Economic Theory, 37 Bus. LAW. 517 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Heller]; Langevoort, Insider Trading andthe Fiduciary Frinciole: A Post-
Chiarella Restatement, 70 CALIF. L. Rv. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Langevoort]; Scott,
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criminal liability for insider trading on a defendant who had no rela-
tionship to the issuer and its shareholders, implying that only those in
such a relationship of trust and confidence are precluded from trading
on material inside information.4 In Chiarella, the Supreme Court
clearly recognized the existence of restraints on insider trading, al-
though thoughtful and scholarly commentaries had questioned their
usefulness and validity.5 The Court, however, limited those restraints
Insider Trading: Rule 1Ob-S, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980);
Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Stock Markets: W1ho Is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom under SEC Rule lOb-S, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217 (1981);
Note, 8 FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 467 (1980); Note, 13 GA. L. REV. 636 (1979); Note, 92
HARV. L. REV. 1538 (1979); Note, 58 NEB. L. REV. 866 (1979).
4. 445 U.S. at 228, 230, 233.
"The duty to disclose arises only when one party has information 'that the other [party]
is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them."' 1d. at 228.
"Thus administrative and judicial interpretations have established that silence. . . may
operate as a fraud actionable under Section 10(b). . . .But such liability is premised upon
a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to
the transaction .... " Id. at 230.
"No duty could arise from petitioner's relationship with the sellers of the target com-
pany's securities for petitioner had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he
was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence .... " Id. at 232.
While the Court's statements refer to a requisite relationship of trust and confidence
between the parties to the transaction, when one of those parties is a security holder of a
publicly held company, such a relationship usually would arise through a relationship with
the corporate issuer. For example, a corporate officer or director owes a fiduciary duty to
the corporation and that duty also extends to its shareholders.
In addition, while the majority opinion strongly suggests that one without a fiduciary or
confidential relationship with the trading security holders has no disclosure obligation to the
market or to trading market participants, the Court left open the possibility that such a
disclosure obligation might arise from a fiduciary relationship with a person other than the
issuer or its security holders. See note 100 infra.
For a discussion of the breadth of the Court's actual holding in Chiarella, see text ac-
companying notes 70-80 infra.
The Court indicated in Chiarella that tippees of persons who were precluded from trad-
ing would share that preclusion. See id. at 230 n.12.
5. See, e.g., H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Hether-
ington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 720; Wu, An Economist
Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 260 (1968).
Not all commentators, however, have agreed. See, e.g., Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price:. A
Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967); Kripke,
Book Review, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 (1967); Marsh, Book Review, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1317
(1968); Mendelson, Book Review, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470 (1969); see also Dooley, Enforce-
ment of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1 (1980); Heller, supra note 3; Scott,
Insider Trading. Rule I0b-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 801 (1980).
This Article, like the Court, assumes that there are and will continue to be restraints on
insider trading and that the abolition of such restraints by legislative or administrative ac-
tion will not occur in the foreseeable future, if at all. See ALL SECURITIES CODE § 1603
and their application to insiders and other fiduciaries.
6
This Article discusses the statutory policy considerations that
should underlie any judicial or administrative development of the in-
sider trading rules, and examines the development of the rules prior to
Chiarella. The Article then describes the Chiarella decision and the
state of insider trading law after Chiarella, demonstrating that Chiarel-
la has developed insider trading rules not fully consistent with statu-
tory policy. Finally, the Article proposes an insider trading standard
that better serves the congressional purpose of promoting fair and hon-
est securities markets.
The Policy and Purpose Underlying the
Insider Trading Proscriptions
Although the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Act)7 specifi-
cally addressed a number of unfair and dishonest market practices that
were common at the time of its enactment, such as market manipula-
tion8 and short-swing trading by officers, directors, and ten-percent
shareholders,9 it addressed other evils only through section 10(b). 10
Section 10(b) was intended to be a general, "catch-all" provision" to
permit the SEC to impose sanctions upon deceptive and manipulative
conduct arising in connection with future securities transactions.
Perhaps because of the general nature of this section, Congress
failed to provide any legislative history to guide the section's applica-
tion to insider trading transactions.12 In fact, the Supreme Court deter-
mined in Chiarella that neither the language nor the legislative history
of section 10(b) afforded guidance on the application of this section and
rule lOb-5 to cases in which the alleged violation is based upon a fail-
ure to disclose.13
The absence of useful legislative history, however, should not
compel the conclusion that the purpose of section 10(b) cannot be de-
(Proposed Official Draft 1980); see also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4,
1980).
6. See text accompanying notes 70-80 infra.
7. - 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9, 15 U.S.C. § 78i (1976).
9. Id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1976).
10. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 (1977).
11. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235.
'12. For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, gee Ruder, CivilLiability Under
Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision ofLegislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 627 (1963) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Ruder].
13. 445 U.S. at 226.
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termined, because a number of the Act's major purposes are set forth in
section 2 of the Act. 14 Although these congressional purposes are re-
cited in general terms, they should allow the courts to follow the usual
practice of interpreting a statute to further the perceived congressional
intent, as determined from the statute and its legislative history. 15
Therefore, because one of the Act's purposes, as set forth in section 2, is
to ensure the maintenance of fair and honest markets, any insider trad-
ing proscription under the Act should have as its underlying purpose
the maximization of both market honesty and market fairness.
To achieve maximum honesty in the securities markets, the courts
and the Commission should require absolute informational equality of
market participants. 16 Anyone with a material informational advan-
tage would be prohibited from trading until the informational advan-
tage had been dissipated by disclosure. While a requirement of
absolute informational equality would further the purpose of providing
honest markets,' 7 because, at least in theory, all participants would
have equal informational strength, it would not result in fair markets.
Many informational advantages, for example, are derived from le-
gitimate activities of potential investors, such as detailed analysis of the
publicly available information regarding a firm.' 8 If such an effort
14. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976): "For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in
securities as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets
are affected with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide for regula-
tion and control of such transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, including
transactions by officers, directors, and principal security holders, to require appropriate re-
ports, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanisms of a national market system for
securities and a national system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions
and the safeguarding of securities and funds related thereto, and to impose requirements
necessary to make such regulation and control reasonably complete and effective, in order to
protect interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power, to protect and
make more effective the national banking system and Federal Reserve System, and to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions." Section 2 was last
amended in 1975. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 2, 89 Stat. 97.
15. See, e.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 691 (1980); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). But see Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1977); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733
(1975).
16. This approach was embraced by the court in dictum in the celebrated case, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
See notes 38-42 & accompanying text infra. This approach was also followed, apparently,
by the district court in Chiarella. See text accompanying notes 64-67 infra.
17. See text accompanying notes 43-51 infra.
18. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to
Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fleischer,
Mundheim & Murphy]; see also Barry, supra note 3, at 1318, 1353; Heller, supra note 3, at
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leads the analyst to the conclusion that a firm's securities are underval-
ued by the market and are therefore a good investment, it seems unfair
to force the potential investor to disclose the fruits of this endeavor to
the public. Requiring disclosure would destroy the value of the infor-
mation ascertained because the investor's knowledge would be no
greater than the general public's. Thus, such a legitimate analysis
could not benefit any investor, and no investor would have the incen-
tive to pursue such effort in the future. 19
This stifling of analytical incentive is unfair both to such potential
investors and to present investors in firms that might be analyzed but
for the hypothetical informational equality requirement. Securities are
often undervalued because of imperfections in the market, but such a
situation often is rectified when an analyst discovers the undervalua-
tion and buys, or recommends that others buy, the security. This in-
creased demand for the security usually will continue until the market
value of the securities reflects the value of the company.
20
If an analyst cannot profit from this discovery, however, there is
no incentive to undertake the analysis. If full informational equality is
required, thereby compelling an analyst to disclose his or her view of a
security's true value prior to trading in the security, then no one who
has gained such a legitimate informational advantage ever will profit;
upon such disclosure, any undervaluation will quickly disappear as the
increased demand for the security forces the price up. Therefore, if full
informational equality is required, present investors will receive less
frequently, if at all, the benefit of price adjustments triggered by analy-
sis, because analysts will have no incentive to examine any firm. Abso-
lute informational equality, which promotes market honesty, is thus not
necessarily consistent with marketfairness.
The antifraud rules, the legislative history of section 10(b), and the
administrative history of rule lOb-5 do not suggest that full informa-
tional equality is required.21 When faced with situations in which the
alleged inside information is the product of the defendant's own efforts,
lower courts have permitted the potential investor to benefit from those
529; ef.Inre Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 915 (1961): "[The inside information] was
not arrived at as a result of perceptive analysis of generally known facts but was obtained
from a director (and associate) during the time when respondents should have known that [it
was undisclosed]."
19. See Barry, supra note 3, at 1318, 1353; Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informa-
tional 4dvantages under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 339-43 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Brudney]; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 817.
20. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 830-31.
21. See Brudney, supra note 19, at 339-40; see generally Ruder, supra note 12.
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efforts by trading prior to disclosure. 22 Furthermore, it is possible to
formulate a simple rule-that all traders who have misappropriated ma-
terial, nonpublic information must disclose it or refrain from trading-
that seems to maximize public access to information generally, while
permitting the use of certain informational advantages to preserve nec-
essary incentives. Such a rule would further the congressional goal of
market honesty by requiring disclosure by .all who have not earned
their informational advantage, and would further the congressional
goal of market fairness by permitting analysts and others to profit from
their legitimate efforts by exploiting their informational advantages.
23
Development of the Insider Trading Rules Under Rule 10b-5
The SEC began to develop the insider trading proscription of rule
1Ob-5 in a 1943 administrative proceeding, In re Ward LaFrance Truck
Co.24 The SEC held that officers, directors, and controlling sharehold-
ers of a closely-held corporation had violated rule 1Ob-5 by failing to
disclose a number of material facts prior to purchasing stock from their
fellow shareholders. 25
A few years later, the courts addressed the application of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. 26 and Speed v.
Transamerica Corp.27 Like Ward LaFrance, these cases involved of-
ficers, directors, and controlling shareholders of closely-held corpora-
tions who had purchased securities of the corporation without
disclosing allegedly material information known to them but unknown
to the sellers of the securities. The defendants' relationship to the cor-
22. See, e.g., General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d
540, 545 (2d Cir. 1967); Brascon, Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 786 n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753, 764-65 (D.N.J. 1955); see also
Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1289 (9th Cir. 1982); Rothschild v.
Teledyne, Inc., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,076, at 90,965
(N.D. Ill. 1971). However, the recent case of Dirks v. SEC, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
983 (D.C. Cir. 1982), holding that a tippee of material inside information (provided by cor-
porate insiders) aided and abetted a violation of rule 1 0b-5 when he passed that information
on to others who traded on it, also indicates that an analyst who is a broker-dealer and who
discovers securities fraud on the part of an issuer has a duty to refrain from trading in that
issuer's securities (or tipping others to do so) until he has notified the SEC of his her
discovery.
23. See text accompanying notes 129-33 infra.
24. 13 S.E.C. 373 (1943).
25. Id. at 381. Among the facts undisclosed was that the corporation's financial condi-
tion and future prospects recently had improved dramatically. Id. at 374.
26. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
27. 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
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porate issuers in whose securities they traded formed the basis for the
courts' decisions. In National Gypsum, the court found that rule lOb-5
should "apply to directors and officers who, in purchasing the stock of
the corporation from others, fail to disclose a [material] fact coming to
their knowledge by reason of their position .... -28 Similarly, in
Transamerica, the court stated: "It is unlawful for an insider, such as a
majority stockholder, to purchase the stock of minority stockholders
without disclosing material facts affecting the value of the stock, known
to the majority stockholder by virtue of his inside position .... -29
Ward LaFrance, National Gypsum, and Transamerica typify the
situations in which rule lOb-5 first was applied to parties with unequal
informational strength. Most of the early cases were brought against
officers, directors, and controlling shareholders who traded in securities
of corporations in face-to-face transactions, rather than in impersonal
transactions on an exchange or in the over-the-counter market. 30 In
most of these cases the courts, or the Commission, applied rule lOb-5
without an elaborate discussion of underlying policy and without deter-
mining the limits of rule lOb-5, simply because the defendants clearly
were both insiders and fiduciaries.
3'
28. 73 F. Supp. at 800.
29. 99 F. Supp. at 828-29.
30. See Rogen v. Ilikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319
F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Northern Trust
Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 103 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Ill. 1952); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951), 135 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), a17'd, 235 F.2d 369
(3d Cir. 1956); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), 83 F.
Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947). But see Joseph v. Farnsworth Radio & Television Corp., 99 F.
Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), ar7'd, 198 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1952). See generally R. JENNINGS &
H. MARSH, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 946 (4th ed. 1977) [here-
inafter cited as JENNINGS & MARSH].
Because face-to-face transactions almost always involve some statement or representa-
tion by the parties, most of the early cases could have been resolved on the basis of rule lOb-
5(b) as incomplete statements or half-truths. JENNINGS & MARSH, supra, at 1043. When
incomplete or misleading representations are made, they are actionable by the aggrieved
party regardless of who the speaker is and whether there is a duty to disclose. See In re
Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
31. That rule lOb-5 could be applied in cases such as Ward LaFrance, National Gyp-
sum, and Transamerica without a great deal of analysis is not surprising, because the rule
was adopted to resolve precisely these types of cases, in which an insider-buyer takes advan-
tage of uninformed sellers. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 30, at 1043; see also R.
HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 778
(2d ed. 1981).
The administrative history of the adoption of rule l0b-5 has been described as follows:
"It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the S.E.C. building
in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor, who was then the Director of the
Trading and Exchange Division. He said, 'I have just been on the telephone with Paul
Rowen,' who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in Boston, 'and he has told me
July 1982]
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While the opinions in some of these early cases do suggest that a
breach by the defendant of a fiduciary duty underlies rule lOb-5 liabil-
ity,32 none of the early cases predicated a violation of the insider trad-
ing proscriptions of rule lb-5 on a finding that the defendant's
nondisclosure constituted a breach of a common law fiduciary duty to
disclose 33 the material, nonpublic information. Thus, although the
early decisions sometimes contained references to the concept of fiduci-
ary duty and may have been based on this duty and the common law
disclosure obligation arising under it, 34 the courts never expressly held
that only fiduciaries are subject to the insider trading proscriptions of
the rule.
That the insider trading proscriptions of rule lOb-5 could be ap-
plied to those who were not traditional insiders, such as officers, direc-
tors, or controlling shareholders of the issuer, was made clear by the
SEC in In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 35 This administrative proceeding
was brought against a broker-dealer and one of its registered represent-
about the president of some company in Boston who is going around buying up the stock of
his company from his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that
the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled
and will be $2.00 a share for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?' So he
came upstairs and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at
Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had there was where 'in
connection with the purchase or sale' should be, and we decided it should be at the end.
"We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember whether
we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper around to all the
commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table, indicat-
ing approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike, who said, 'Well,' he said, 'we are
against fraud, aren't we?' That is how it happened." Conference on Codification of the Fed-
eral Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967) (comments of Milton V. Freeman).
32. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963); Reed v. Riddle Air-
lines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959); James Blackstone Memorial Library Ass'n v. Gulf M. &
O.R.R., 264 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959); Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 176 (D. Del. 1955), ar'd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
33. At common law, a failure to disclose is fraudulent only in the face of a duty to
disclose; such a duty arises from a fiduciary relationship. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977); see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 n.9 (1980);
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932); see also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S.
419 (1909) (duty to disclose "special facts" arises from a fiduciary relationship); Mansfield
Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1959).
34. Commentators have taken the position that the disclosure obligation that the courts
found to exist in these early cases, and later ones, is based upon the fiduciary relationship of
the defendant to the plaintiff. See, e.g., JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 30, at 946; Brudney,
supra note 19, at 326; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 804; Ruder, supra
note 12, at 641. Professor Brudney, however, notes that there is nothing in the language or
legislative history of section 10(b) and rule lob-5 that confines their coverage to "insiders."
Brudney, supra note 19, at 329.
35. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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atives who received confidential information regarding an issuer's
planned dividend reduction. The information had been obtained from
a fellow registered representative who was also a member of the board
of directors of the issuer. The defendant representative traded in the
securities of that issuer for the accounts of various clients while the
information remained undisclosed to the public. Finding that the indi-
vidual defendant had violated rule lOb-5, the SEC held that
Section 17 [of the Securities Act of 1933] and Rule 10b-5 apply
to securities transactions by 'any person.' Misrepresentations will lie
within their ambit, no matter who the speaker may be. An affirma-
tive duty to disclose material information has been traditionally im-
posed upon corporate insiders, particularly officers, directors or
controlling stockholders. We and the courts have consistently held
that insiders must disclose material facts which are known to them by
virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment. Failure to make disclosures in these circumstances consti-
tutes a violation of the antifraud provisions.
3 6
The SEC rejected the defendant's argument that only officers, di-
rectors, and controlling shareholders are subject to the insider trading
proscription of rule lOb-5, finding that such proscriptions can apply to
persons other than these traditional insiders. The SEC based this de-
termination on its belief that the obligation to disclose or to refrain
from trading arises from (1) the existence of a relationship affording
access to information intended to be available only for a corporate pur-
pose, and (2) the unfairness of allowing a person to take advantage of
that information by trading without disclosure. 37 Under this analytical
framework, the Commission demonstrated that the defendant should
be subject to the insider trading proscriptions. In establishing that
these rules were not limited to officers, directors, and controlling share-
holders, however, the Commission did not address the outer limits of
the rule.
Seven years after the SEC decision in Cady, Roberts, the Second
Circuit decided SEC v. Texas GufSulphur Co. ,38 in which it eliminated
any doubt regarding the applicability of the insider trading proscrip-
tions of rule lOb-5 to persons other than officers, directors, and control-
36. .d. at 911.
37. Id. at 912 & n.15; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
38. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Several judicial
opinions emanate from the same famous set of facts. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Cannon v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur, 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 323 F. Supp.
990 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Fink v. Coates, 323 F. Supp. 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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ling shareholders of an issuer. In holding that the lower court had
improperly denied the injunctive relief sought by the SEC against cor-
porate officers, directors, and employees who had traded in the securi-
ties of the corporation while in possession of nonpublic information
concerning a major ore discovery in Ontario, Canada,39 the Second
Circuit endorsed the rule adopted by the SEC in Cady, Roberts,40 and
in dictum broadly extended that test:
[T]he Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who
may not be strictly termed an 'insider' within the meaning of sec.
16(b) of the Act .... Thus, anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence,
or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recom-
mending the securities concerned while such information remains
undisclosed.
41
Although, under the facts of Texas Guf Sulphur, the court could have
limited its discussion to persons who could easily be characterized as
"corporate insiders" or their tippees, and although there is some sug-
gestion in the court's opinion that the basis for the application of the
insider trading proscriptions was a breach of fiduciary duty by the de-
fendant, 42 the court did not do so.
Not all informational advantages, however, were proscribed by
Texas Gulf Sulphur, as illustrated by three cases decided by the Second
Circuit within a few months of Texas Gulf Sulphur: Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc. ,43 General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries,44 and
SEC v. Great American Industries.45 In Genesco and General Time, it
was alleged that rule lOb-5 was violated by a tender offeror's failure to
disclose the anticipated tender offer to persons with whom it dealt prior
to the public announcement of the offer. In both cases, the court held
39. 401 F.2d at 863-64.
40. "The essence of rule lOb-5 is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the
securities of a corporation, has 'access, directly or indirectly, to information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone' may not
take 'advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is
dealing,' i.e., the investing public." Id. at 848 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C.
907, 912 (1961)).
41. Id.
42. "Whether predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts... or on the 'special facts'
doctrine, [rule lOb-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of the securities mar-
ketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to
material information . I..." d  The individual defendants were all officers, directors, or
employees of the issuer, or tippees of such persons.
43. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
44. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
45. 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969).
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that the rule did not require disclosure under these circumstances.46 As
the court stated in General Time, "We know of no rule of law, applica-
ble at the time, that a purchaser of stock, who was not an 'insider' and
had no fiduciary relation to a prospective seller, had any obligation to
reveal circumstances that might raise a seller's demand and thus abort
the sale."47
In Great American Industries, the SEC alleged that rule lOb-5 had
been violated by a purchaser of securities who traded property for
shares of a corporation without disclosing to the selling corporation the
enormity of the finder's fee paid to his agent. Holding that neither the
buyer nor his agent had any obligation to disclose, the court refused to
interpret rule lOb-5 as imposing a duty of disclosure on those who do
not occupy a "special relationship" to a trader in securities. "[T]o read
Rule lOb-5 as placing an affirmative duty of disclosure on persons who,
in contrast to 'insiders' or broker dealers, did not occupy a special rela-
tionship to a seller or buyer of securities would be occupying new
ground and would require most careful consideration. 48
Because these cases were decided by the court that decided Texas
GufSuophur, they should have cast some doubt on the viability of the
sweeping dictum of that case that "anyone in the possession of material
inside information must either disclose it . . . or . . . abstain from
trading. . .. ,,49 These decisions, however, did not eliminate the possi-
bility that any person in possession of inside information might be
deemed an insider,50 and thus become subject to the proscription on
insiders.
Furthermore, in none of these cases did the defendants possess in-
formation misappropriated from the corporation or relating to the in-
ternal affairs of the corporation or "market" 51 information about the
46. General Tme, 403 F.2d at 164-65; Genesco, 384 F.2d at 545-46; see also Polinsky v.
MCA, Inc., 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (9th Cir. 1982).
47. 403 F.2d at 164. The Williams Act, Pub.'L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968),
which added § 13(d) to the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), was enacted
shortly before the General Time opinion was rendered, but was not in effect at the time of the
transaction involved in that case.
48. 407 F.2d at 460.
49. 401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
50. See text accompanying note 41 supra. See also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 250 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting): "The concept of the insider, itself has been flex-
ible; wherever confidential information has been abused, prophylaxis has followed."
51. Commentators have sometimes distinguished between "corporate" and "market"
information, the former generally referring to inside information regarding the corporation's
assets, operations, and business, and the latter generally referring to information about the
supply of and demand for the corporation's securities. See, e.g., JENNINGS & MARSH, supra
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anticipated activities of third parties. Rather, the defendants possessed
information about their own acquisition plans, based on their analysis
and evaluation of the company and its securities.5 2
The results in these cases suggested that, despite the dictum of
Texas GufSulphur, the insider trading proscriptions of rule lOb-5 gen-
erally would be applied only to insiders, fiduciaries, and broker-deal-
ers. Many subsequent cases addressed the issue whether to characterize
as corporate insiders those persons who had traded upon or tipped in-
side information but who were not officers, directors, substantial share-
holders, or employees of the issuer. Among those characterized as
insiders were underwriters,5 3 market makers,5 4 financial columnists,
55
friendly tender offerors,5 6 friends of corporate officers, directors, and
controlling shareholders,5 7 and finders or merger negotiators.5 8
After Texas Gulf Sulphur, the SEC began a campaign to prevent
financial printers and their employees from trading in the securities of
corporations about which they obtained information by virtue of their
printing activities. This campaign resulted in several cases involving
employees of financial printers who, after learning valuable nonpublic
information in the course of their employment, went into the market
and purchased the stock of various corporations that were likely to be
the targets of acquisition efforts. 59 The SEC had many successes and
only one failure60 in this program before addressing the conduct of
note 30, at 952; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 799. The "insider" infor-
mation involved in Chiarella was market information. See 445 U.S. at 231.
52. Cf. Mills v. Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1955) (syndicate that bought
stock of corporation planning to sell corporate assets immediately not liable to selling share-
holders for failing to disclose its plans).
53. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
54. Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
55. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
56. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970).
57. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
58. SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); see also SEC v. Lerner, David, Lit-
tenberg & Samuel, SEC Litigation Release No. 9049, 19 SEC Docket 1153 (D.D.C. April 2,
1980) (indicating that attorney who learns of information affecting client is precluded from
trading in client's securities).
59. SEC v. Manderano, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,357
(D.N.J. 1978); SEC v. Primar Typographers, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 95,734 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Ayoub, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,567 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
60. SEC v. Sorg Printing Co., [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (printing company not held liable for unlawful actions of its employ-
ees, when it had taken steps to safeguard against improper use of nonpublic information).
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Vincent Chiarella, the employee of a financial printer, and determining
that it was sufficiently egregious to merit criminal prosecution as well
as civil sanctions.
Insider Trading Proscriptions Under the Chiarella Rule
In 1978, Vincent Chiarella, formerly an employee of a major
financial printer, was tried in federal court on seventeen counts of will-
fully violating section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 61 Chiarella was convicted
on all seventeen counts following a jury trial during which he admitted
that he had purchased securities of five different companies in open
market transactions, in each case shortly prior to the announcement by
a corporate suitor of its intention to attempt to acquire control 62 of the
company whose securities Chiarella had just purchased; that he resold
those shares for an aggregate profit of approximately $30,000 shortly
after the public announcement of the respective takeover proposals;
that he had learned of the proposed takeovers and had deciphered the
identities63 of the five target companies from confidential proofs of the
disclosure documents which his employer was printing for use by the
acquiring company in its takeover effort; and that the information
which he had thus obtained was material information that had not
been publicly disclosed at the time of his purchases. 64
The trial court in essence adopted the dictum of Texas Gulf
Sulphur65 in instructing the jury that anyone in possession of material
inside information has a duty to disclose or to refrain from trading.
66
61. Section 32(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), provides in
pertinent part: "Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter.. . or any
rule or regulation thereunder the violation of which is made unlawful or the observance of
which is required under the terms of this chapter,.. . shall upon conviction be fined not
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both .... " Chiarella was
the first person subjected to criminal liability for nondisclosure under § 10(b). See Chiarella
v. United States, 445 U.S. at 235 n.20.
62. Four of the takeover attempts were to be by tender offer, while the other involved a
merger. Neither the government nor Chiarella treated the difference in structure as signifi-
cant at the trial or on appeal. Id. at 224 n.1; United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363
(2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
63. The actual names of the target companies were not inserted in the proofs of the
disclosure documents pertaining to these transactions until shortly before the commence-
ment of the production of the final documents. Until that time, blanks or a fictitious name
was inserted in lieu of the true name of the target. Chiarella was able to determine the true.
identity of each target from the number of spaces and characters reserved for its actual name
and from the description of its business contained in the proofs. Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. at 224.
64. 588 F.2d at 1363-64 n.5.
65, See notes 40-41 & accompanying text supra.
66. See 1d. at 1364 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848). Chiarel-
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Chiarella stipulated that he possessed material, undisclosed informa-
tion at the time of his purchases, and was subsequently convicted.
67
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected his argument that the duty
to disclose material, nonpublic information or to refrain from trading
applies only to insiders of, and those in a fiduciary relation with, the
issuer of the securities traded. Affirming Chiarella's conviction, the
court found that the insider trading proscriptions are designed to en-
sure market integrity, and are not limited to the enforcement of fiduci-
ary duties.6 8 The court therefore held that the insider trading rules
apply to those who regularly receive material, nonpublic information.
69
In 1980, in Chiarella v. United States,70 the United States Supreme
Court reversed Chiarella's conviction, holding that the jury had been
improperly instructed.71 Contrary to the trial court's instructions, the
Supreme Court held that "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information. ' 72 In
la argued that only insiders and those in a fiduciary relation with the issuer have this duty to
disclose or refrain. 588 F.2d at 1364. The statement in Texas Gulf Sulphur that anyone in
possession of material inside information has such a duty is dictum. See text accompanying
notes 38-52 supra.
The jury instructions were summarized by the Supreme Court at 445 U.S. at 236.
67. Chiarella was sentenced to thirteen concurrent one-year terms, each to be sus-
pended after a total of one month of imprisonment, followed by five years probation.
United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364 n.7. Chiarella's defense was hampered by the
trial court's refusal to permit him to testify that he had disgorged his trading profits pursuant
to a Commission consent decree. Id. at 1371. The reported opinions do not indicate
whether the jury was aware that Chiarella also had been fired by his employer.
68. Id. at 1365.
69. Id. In dissent, Judge Meskill strongly argued that it was improper to impose crimi-
nal liability on Chiarella because no case had ever imposed civil liability for insider trading
"on anyone other than an insider, the tippee of an insider, or one standing in a special
relationship with other traders." Id. at 1373. He further argued that existing case law re-
quired disclosure under rule lOb-5 only when a fiduciary or special relationship existed, id.
at 1373-75, and that, in light of the case law, Chiarella had not been given fair warning that
his conduct was criminal. Id. at 1377-78.
70. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
71. Justice Powell's opinion for the majority was joined by Justices Stewart, White,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, although Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion to emphasize that
the Court did not approve of the defendant's conduct and to discuss alternate theories of
liability that the government might have advanced. Concurring in the result, Justice Bren-
nan gave his approval to the summary of the law presented by the Chief Justice's dissent.
See note 73 infra.
72. 445 U.S. at 235. "The jury instructions demonstrate that petitioner was convicted
merely because of his failure to disclose material, non-public information to sellers from
whom he bought the stock of the target corporation .... " Id. The trial judge had in-
structed the jury that conviction could be based on conduct that operated "as a fraud or
deceit upon any person." Id. at 236. The jury then was instructed that "failure by Chiarella




the process of reaching this narrow holding,73 the majority examined a
number of cases,74 from which it concluded that "the established doc-
trine" is that a duty to disclose arises from a "specific relationship"
between two parties, 75 and that "the duty to disclose arises when one
party has information 'that the other [party] is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence between
them.' "76
At least three Justices of the Supreme Court interpreted the major-
ity opinion to hold that a person in possession of material, nonpublic
information must disclose or refrain from trading only if there is a duty
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence.77 While
this interpretation of the Court's holding has not been unanimously
accepted,78 the majority opinion strongly suggests that the duty to dis-
close or refrain from trading applies only to those who have a confiden-
tial or fiduciary relationship to the issuer and its security holders.79 On
the other hand, persons who have no such relationship but who possess
73. The scope of the majority's holding was the subject of some confusion among mem-
bers of the Court. Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed "with the Court's determination that
petitioner owed no duty of disclosure to the sellers. . . ." Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). In dissent, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, interpreted the majority
opinion to hold that "a failure to disclose violates the Rule only when the responsibilities of
a [fiduciary] relationship. . . have been breached." Id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger believed that "[tihe Court's holding, however,
is much more limited, namely, that mere possession of material nonpublic information is
insufficient to create a duty to disclose. . . ." Id. at 243 n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Ac-
cordingly, he interpreted the majority opinion to indicate "that the Court has not rejected
the view. . . that an absolute duty to disclose or refrain [from trading] arises from the very
act of misappropriating nonpublic information." Id; f SEC Exchange Act Release No.
17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980), promulgating Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1980), discussed in
notes 108-10 & accompanying text infra.
Decisions subsequent to Carela indicate that the lower courts have embraced the
views of Justices Stevens and Blackmun regarding the scope and meaning of the Court's
determination in Chiarella. See notes 81-91 & accompanying text infra.
74. 445 U.S. at 226-30; see Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972);
Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975); General
Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026
(1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951); In re Cady, Rob-
erts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
75. 445 U.S. at 233.
76. Id. at 228 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
77. See note 73 supra.
78. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 243 & n.4 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see
also Dirks v. SEC, 14 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 903, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982); SEC Exchange
Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980); Langevoort, supra note 3, at 12 n.44.
79. See note 4 supra. Chiarella had no relationship to the target companies in whose
securities he traded. His employer had been engaged by the acquiring companies, and not
by the target companies. See 445 U.S. at 224, 232. The Court, however, left open the possi-
July 1982]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
material, nonpublic information regarding it may trade in the issuer's
securities and profit from their informational advantage, unless such
trade is in breach of a duty to someone else.8 0
Lower Court Application of the Chiarela Rule
Subsequent lower court decisions have mostly ignored Chiarella's
narrow holding, while embracing the interpretation that the duty to
disclose or refrain from trading arises only from a fiduciary or other
confidential relationship. For example, in Elkind v. Liggett & Myers,
Inc. ,8 the Second Circuit considered the potential liability under rule
1Ob-5 of a corporation and its officers for tipping others about allegedly
material inside information respecting the corporation.8 2 Holding that
corporate insiders must refrain from tipping, the court observed: "The
Supreme Court ruled in Chiarella that there can be no violation of
§ 10(b) unless the party so charged has violated a duty arising out of a
relationship of trust. A corporate insider who tips confidential infor-
mation clearly violates a fiduciary obligation."8 3 Thus, the Second Cir-
cuit appeared to interpret Chiarella as holding that only those in a
relationship of trust and confidence can violate rule lOb-5.
8 4
The Second Circuit again set forth this view in Walton v. Morgan
Stanley & Co. ,85 in which a derivative suit was brought on behalf of
Olinkraft Corp., a Delaware corporation, for breach of fiduciary duty
owed to that corporation.8 6 The plaintiff alleged that Morgan Stanley
& Co., as investment banker for Kennecott Copper Corp., had been
given confidential information respecting Olinkraft in connection with
a contemplated acquisition of Olinkraft by Kennecott. After the acqui-
sition had been abandoned, Morgan Stanley allegedly used the confi-
dential information for its own benefit. The court affirmed the
dismissal of the suit because it could find no fidiciary relationship be-
tween Morgan Stanley and Olinkraft. Morgan Stanley was Kenne-
bility of liability premised on a fiduciary duty to someone other than the security holders of
the issuer. See note 100 infra.
80. For a discussion of the possibility that insider trading may be precluded by a duty
to someone other than the issuer, see note 100 infra. See also Heller, supra note 3, at 535-38;
Langevoort, supra note 3, at 44-50.
81. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
82. The court found that some of the information involved was immaterial. Id. at 166.
83. Id. at 165 n.14 (citation omitted).
84. See also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), discussed in note
100 infra.
85. 623 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1980).
86. Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity; Delaware law governed the case. Id. at
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cott's agent, not Olinkraft's. Absent a fiduciary relationship, there was
no breach of fiduciary duty under Delaware law. In determining that
no fiduciary relationship existed, the court cited Chiarella for the prop-
osition that "[t]he doctrine that a duty to disclose or refrain from trad-
ing arises from a specific relationship between two parties-and not
simply from the fact that some investors have more information than
others-is now established in both state and federal law."
'87
Several district courts have relied on Chiarella in finding that de-
fendants had no duty to disclose. In Kirshner v. Goldberg,88 a benefici-
ary of the New York City Teachers Retirement System sought to
impose rule lOb-5 liability upon Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. and
others. The Retirement System, along with a number of other pension
trusts, had entered into an agreement, to which Morgan was a party,
obligating the pension funds to buy securities to be issued by New York
City or by its Municipal Assistance Corporation. The plaintiff alleged
that Morgan had violated rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose to the pen-
sion trusts that it was reducing its own holdings of the securities. The
court stated: "Holding that a purchaser-seller relationship alone is not
enough to create a duty to disclose under § 10(b), the [Chiarella] Court
stated that a fiduciary relationship must exist as a prerequisite for a
finding of liability."'8 9 The court accordingly dismissed part of the
complaint against Morgan, because no such fiduciary relationship was
alleged.90
Thus, the lower federal courts seem to interpret Chiarella as did
several of the Justices: a duty of disclosure under rule lOb-5 can be
predicated only upon a fiduciary or confidential relationship. 91 Thus,
87. Id. at 799 n.6. The Ninth Circuit appears to agree with the Second Circuit's inter-
pretation of Chiarella. In SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980), the Ninth Circuit
discussed "Chiarella's establishment of a 'duty' requirement" and noted: "The Court held
[in Chiarella] that § 10(b) liability for silence in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities 'is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confi-
dence between the parties to a transaction."' Id. at 652 n.23 (quoting Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. at 230).
88. 506 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
89. Id. at 458 (citations omitted).
90. See also Staffin v. Greenberg, 509 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (tender offeror had
no duty to disclose tender offer plans before commencing market purchases based either on
pre-Chiarella law regarding tender offerors or on Chiarella rule that duty to disclose arises
only from confidential or fiduciary relationship); Feldman v. Simkins Indus., 429 F. Supp.
839 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (one of three large shareholders of a publicly held company had no
duty to disclose material inside information regarding the company before selling his shares
in the market under the Chiarella rule that a duty to disclose arises from a relationship of
trust and confidence).
91. See also United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); O'Connor & Assoc.
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Chiarella and subsequent cases have developed a rule that prohibits the
use of material inside information by some, but not by others.
Criticism of the Chiarella Rule
If the Chiarella rule had been formulated in response to policy
considerations, its disparate treatment of fiduciaries and nonfiduciaries
might be justified. Chiarella, however, was not grounded on such con-
siderations; rather, the decision was based on the Court's view of cer-
tain precedents in the law of insider trading developed by the lower
courts and by the SEC.92 These precedents, in turn, generally had been
decided without regard to the underlying policies or purposes that in-
sider trading proscriptions ought to serve.93 Thus, Chiarella and its
progeny represent the culmination of four decades of ad hoc judicial
development of insider trading rules. These rules are not tied to any
policy other than those underlying common law fraud.
If the insider trading rules are to be based on a policy, one source
of such a policy would be congressional intent. Congressional intent
suggests that the insider trading proscriptions 94 should attempt to maxi-
mize disclosure of material inside information and at the same time
permit fair treatment of those who derive informational advantages
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Benoay v. Decker, 517 F.
Supp. 490,495 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 1981); Xaphes v. Shearson, Hayden, Stone, Inc., 508 F. Supp.
882, 886 (S.D. Fla. 1981); E.D. Warde & Sons v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 502 F. Supp. 461,
463-64 (D. Colo. 1980); Marrero v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Supp. 568, 574 (E.D.
La. 1980). But cf. State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981). One issue before the district
court in Fluor was whether the defendant corporation had an obligation to disclose to the
market place the existence of an important contract, recently awarded to the defendant,
when the market was rife with rumors of material developments respecting the company.
Holding that "[e]ven in the absence of insider trading or prior inaccurate disclosures [by the
company] ... , a violation of Rule lOb-5(c) may arise from a failure to disclose where, as
here, rumors are rampant, the price of stock is shooting upward and the defendants are in
possession of all material facts but refrain from disclosing them," 500 F. Supp. at 292, the
district court clearly viewed Chiarella as setting forth a nonexclusive test for the determina-
tion of when a duty to disclose arises. See id. at 291-92.
The Second Circuit, however, rejected the district court's conclusions regarding the
company's duty to disclose under rule lOb-5. Without discussing the exclusivity or non-
exclusivity of the Chiarella disclosure duty, the Second Circuit held that a company "has no
duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless these rumors can be attributed to
the company." State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir.
1981). The District of Columbia Circuit, however, clearly reads Chiarella as setting forth a
nonexclusive test for when the duty to disclose arises. See Dirks v. SEC, 14 SEc. REG. & L.
REP. 983, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
92. See 445 U.S. at 226-35.
93. See notes 24-58 & accompanying text supra.




Two issues thus are raised by the Chiarella decision and subse-
quent cases developing the Chiarella rule. The first is whether the rule
that only those in a fiduciary or confidential relationship are precluded
from trading on material inside information is consistent with this con-
gressional purpose. The second issue is why, if Chiarella is inconsistent
with this congressional purpose, the Court adopted this rule instead of
one more consistent with the congressional goal of fair and honest
markets.
Arguably, the honesty and fairness of markets are lessened by the
conduct of market participants who profit from the use of inside infor-
mation without providing to the market the benefits that flow from the
effort and analysis invested in creating an informational advantage.
9 6
The SEC has long assumed that investors expect that material inside
information will not be used to their detriment in market transac-
tions.97 For this reason, the SEC continues to give priority to the pre-
vention of insider trading.
98
If liability for insider trading is dependent on a relationship with
the issuer and its security holders, a person lacking such a relationship
will be permitted to use inside information regardless of whether that
person developed or misappropriated the informational advantage. By
indicating that one without such a relationship has no disclosure obli-
gation to the market or to the market participants with whom he or she
deals, Chiarella and its progeny have lessened the possibility that such
a person may be liable to such participants under section 10(b) and rule
95. One who develops an informational advantage from his or her own legitimate ef-
forts should be free to authorize others to benefit from it, and authorized users of such
advantage should receive the same treatment as the one who authorized its use. See
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 811-14; see also Cohen v. Colvin, 266 F.
Supp. 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). In Chiarella, the Court noted that "warehousing" is not prohib-
ited by rule lOb-5, 445 U.S. at 234-35. "Warehousing" involves the use by authorized per-
sons of informational advantages legitimately derived by another. See Barry, supra note 3,
at 1373; Fleischer,. Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 811-14. "Tippees" and other
unauthorized users of material information should be and are treated the same as their tip-
per. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12. Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(1980), discussed in text accompanying notes 108-10 infra, however, subjects both authorized
and unauthorized users of information that has been legitimately developed by a tender
offeror in making the decision to tender, to the "disclose or refrain" requirement of that rule.
96. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18 at 816-17; see also SEC Ex-
change Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980).
97. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980).
98. See id; interview with SEC Commissioner Thomas, [July-Dec.] SEC. REo. & L.
REP. (BNA) No. 622, at B-4, (Sept. 30, 1981); speech of SEC Chairman Shad to the Invest-
ment Association of New York on September 24, 1981, id at A-2.
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In theory, a trader who has no relationship to the issuer and its
security holders could be liable under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 if
the use of inside information violates a duty to persons other than the
issuer and its shareholders.1 ° Nevertheless, reducing the risk of suits
99. In certain situations, such a person may violate rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3
(1980). See text accompanying notes 108-10 infra. It may also be possible for such a person
to be liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to persons other than the trading shareholders
for breach of some fiduciary duty. See note 100 infra.
100. In Chiarella, the government argued that Mr. Chiarella owed a duty to his em-
ployer and its clients, the acquiring companies, to refrain from using confidential informa-
tion entrusted to the employer and that his breach of this duty furnished a basis for finding
that a fraud had been perpetrated on those clients and on the selling shareholders in viola-
tion of rule 10b-5. Although the majority refused to consider this argument, because it had
not been properly presented to the jury, Justice Stevens discussed the argument in his con-
curring opinion as follows: "Arguably, when petitioner bought securities in the open mar-
ket, he violated . . . a duty of silence owed to the acquiring companies. . . . The court
correctly does not address the second question: whether petitioner's breach of his duty of
silence-a duty he unquestionably owed to his employer and to his employer's customers-
could give rise to criminal liability under Rule lOb-5. Respectable arguments could be
made in support of either position. On the one hand, if we assume that petitioner breached
a duty to the acquiring companies that had entrusted confidential information to his em-
ployers, a legitimate argument could be made that his activities constituted a 'fraud or de-
ceit' upon those companies 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' On the
other hand, inasmuch as those companies would not be able to recover damages from peti-
tioner for violating Rule lOb-5 because they were neither purchasers nor sellers of target
company securities,. . . it could also be argued that no actionable violation of Rule lOb-5
had occurred. I think the court wisely leaves the resolution of this issue for another day."
Subsequent to Chiarella, in United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), the
Second Circuit reversed a district court's dismissal of an indictment that charged the defend-
ants with criminal violations of rule lOb-5. The theory of the indictment was that those
defendants who were employees of an investment banking firm breached a fiduciary duty to
their employer and their employer's clients when they assisted in trading, without disclosure,
in target company securities, knowing that clients of their employer were about to tender for
target company securities.
The conduct at issue was similar to that in Chiarella, so the government, in an attempt
to overcome the defect in its Chiarella case, based its indictment on the theory that the
defendants owed a duty of trust and confidence to their employer and its clients, rather than
to the trading shareholders, and that in using confidential information for their own benefit
and without disclosure they violated this duty and rule lOb-5. Thus, the indictment used the
theory that the Supreme Court had discussed but not decided in Chiarella.
The Second Circuit concluded that the defendants' alleged conduct, if proved at trial,
would constitute a fraud on the employer and on the employer's clients in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities, and therefore was actionable under rule lOb-5. Because
Newman involved a criminal indictment, the court did not address the question, raised by
Justice Stevens in Chiarella, whether the employer or its clients, who had neither sold nor
purchased securities, would have standing to sue under rule lOb-5.
In upholding the indictment based on this theory, it can be argued that the Second
Circuit acted consistently with Chiarella, because the duty of the defendants to disclose or
refrain from trading arose from a fiduciary or confidential relationship. The majority opin-
ion in that case, however, stressed the importance of a relationship between the parties to the
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by market participants against persons who trade on inside information
lessens the deterrence against the use of such information.
transaction and expressly refused to decide the viability of the theory on which Newman was
based.
In O'Connor and Associates v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179
(S.D.N.Y. 1981), the district court applied Newman to find that a rule lOb-5 cause of action
had been stated by an options trader, which alleged that insiders of two corporations, one of
which was about to tender for outstanding securities of the other, had tipped material, inside
information to persons who then purchased call options on the stock of the target corpora-
tion from the options trader. The tippees moved to dismiss, arguing that, after Chiarella, no
cause of action could be stated against them because neither they nor their tippers owed any
fiduciary duty to the options trader. The court agreed that no fiduciary duty was owed to
such a trader by these people, distinguishing the position of an options trader from that of a
corporate stockholder.
The court went on to hold, however, that the options trader had stated a cause of action
under rule lOb-5 because the insider-tippers owed a fiduciary duty to their respective corpo-
rations to avoid tipping or trading on inside information. Because of this duty, such insiders
and their tippees could not trade or tip, absent disclosure of the material inside information
"to the investing public," and when they did so, a violation of rule lOb-5 occurred. The
court determined that the options trader, who was a seller of securities by virtue of his sale of
the call options, had standing to assert this rule lob-5 violation, although the fiduciary duty
that was breached by the insiders was not owed to him.
These cases demonstrate that the lower courts, having interpreted Chiarella as eliminat-
ing the direct use of rule lob-5 by persons without a fiduciary relationship with a non-
disclosing trader or tipper, will go to some lengths to protect such persons indirectly by
finding other fiduciary relations and their breach on which to base the lob-5 claim. Whether
the Supreme Court will ultimately approve this expansive use of the alternate theory which
the Court refused to consider in Chiarella remains to be seen.
Even if the Supreme Court were to adopt this expansion of the views that it set forth in
Chiarella, the rule still would not provide a strong deterrent against the use of inside infor-
mation in circumstances in which its use is destructive of market honesty and fairness. Ob-
viously, there will be no deterrence unless there is a reasonable prospect of a lawsuit being
brought against the insider trader by someone.
If the insider trader has no fiduciary or confidential relationship with the issuer, its
shareholders, or anyone else involved in the transaction, there can be no possibility of such a
lawsuit. In such circumstances there is no duty to disclose, even under Newman and
O'Connor, and, therefore, there will be no rule lob-5 violation. Thus, a suit by private
litigants, by the SEC, or by the Justice Department is not possible.
If the insider trader has a fiduciary or confidential relationship with someone other than
the issuer and its security holders, as in Newman, it is possible that a duty to disclose or to
refrain from trading can arise out of that relationship. Even if that relationship can support
a rule lob-5 violation, however, that does not answer the questions of who can sue to redress
such violations and how likely it is that such a suit will be brought.
If a rule lob-5 violation has occurred as a result of a breach of the "disclose or refrain"
duty arising out of a relationship with someone other than the issuer and its security holders,
the SEC can seek injunctive relief or can refer the matter to the Department of Justice for
criminal prosecution. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981). Although suit
by the government is thus possible in such circumstances, it is doubtful that this will provide
a real deterrent, because such a suit is not likely. As the SEC is fond of saying, it has
precious few resources and really must rely to a large extent on private practitioners and
litigants to bring about compliance with the securities laws.
It may be unlikely that a private litigant would sue to redress a rule lob-5 violation that
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It would be unnecessary to deter the use of material, nonpublic
information if the use of such information were consistent with market
fairness and honesty, as it is when the person profiting from its use has
developed the informational advantage from legitimate efforts and
analysis.' 0' Many people, however, after coming into possession of
material, nonpublic information regarding an issuer with whom they
have no fiduciary or confidential relationship, use that information in
an unauthorized way for their personal benefit. This use of informa-
tion adversely affects market fairness 0 2 and honesty and, just as impor-
tantly, public perceptions of the market. Furthermore, this use of
inside information now is deterred significantly only when the user has
a special relationship to the issuer and its security holders. 0
3
For example, an employee of a financial printer often receives,
while working for the acquiring company, information respecting the
target company in a proposed tender offer. After Chiarella and its
progeny, the employee may purchase the securities of the target com-
arises from a breach of fiduciary duty to someone other than the issuer and its shareholders.
First, the person to whom the fiduciary duty ran will lack standing to sue, if he or she is
neither a purchaser nor a seller of securities. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 238
(Stevens, J., concurring). Second, even if such a person has standing, he or she may lack
incentive to sue the insider trader. For example, in an acquisition situation such as those
involved in Chiarella and Newman, it may be difficult for the acquiring company-the party
to whom the fiduciary duty ran-to establish the amount of damages, which presumably
would reflect the increased cost to it resulting from the market rise caused by the insider
trader's conduct. On the other hand, those damages may be insignificant in comparison
with the total amount involved in the transaction. For either reason, the acquiring company
might be expected to decline to sue the insider trader.
Even if the person to whom the fiduciary duty ran cannot be expected to sue, it is
possible that someone else might have standing to sue. Standing was conferred in
O'Connor, where such person was a purchaser and seller of securities, because the court
found that a fiduciary duty of the insiders to the corporation gave rise to a disclosure duty to
the market. The effect of this was to confer standing to sue in such a case on all trading
market participants. Allowing trading market participants to sue is precisely what is needed
to deter insider trading; but it is doubtful that there will be many cases like O'Connor in
which the court will be able to achieve this result, since in O'Connor, unlike Newman and
Chiarella, the insider had a relationship with the corporation.
Unless market participants have standing to sue the insider trader, deterrence of insider
trading will be lessened. While it may be possible to construct a theory in some cases, such
as O'Connor, by which market participants gain standing to sue as a result of a breach of a
confidential or fiduciary duty to someone else, such attempts to circumvent Chiarella seem a
less preferable alternative to a straightforward rule under which market participants who
lack a fiduciary relationship with the insider trader could sue in appropriate circumstances.
See text accompaning notes 127-39 infra.
101. See notes 18-20 & accompanying text supra.
102. See Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 816-17; see also Barry, supra
note 3, at 1352; Langevoort, supra note 3, at 2; Marsh, Book Review, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1317,
1320 (1968).
103. See note 100 supra.
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pany without fear of liability to the selling shareholders under section
10(b) and rule l0b-5. I' 4 If, however, the transaction were structured as
a merger or other "friendly" acquisition, in connection with which the
printer had been employed by both companies to print a joint proxy
statement or press release, a trading employee of that printer might be
liable to the selling shareholders of the acquired company because he
or she would now have an agency and, accordingly, a fiduciary rela-
tionship to that company.
10 5
Other examples of parties shielded by the Chiarella rule from lia-
bility to market participants include one who overhears a conversation
between a potential tender offeror and one of its advisors regarding a
proposed tender offer, a visitor to the offices of a potential tender of-
feror who happens to see a "confidential" proposal respecting a tender,
or a burglar who breaks into the tender offeror's office and steals a copy
of such a confidential proposal.' 0 6 In none of these cases does the per-
son who learns of the confidential information have any relationship to
the target company, to its security holders, or to'the tender offeror.
I0 7
Under Chiarella and its progeny, therefore, these people may trade
with impunity under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 although each has
knowingly benefitted from the intentional misappropriation of confi-
dential information. This result does not seem to be in accord with
Congress's intent in passing section 10(b), and seems unreasonable and
patently unjust.
Recognizing this, the SEC promulgated rule 14e-3108 pursuant to
section 14(e) of the Act'0 9 shortly after the decision in Chiarella. This
104. There may be liability under rule 14e-3. See text accompanying notes 108-10 infra.
105. In fact, one of the five takeover proposals in Chiarella involved a merger. The
parties, however, did not regard as significant the difference between a merger and a tender
offer. See note 62 supra.
106. Scienter must be proved in order for a violation of rule lob-5 to be established.
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212
(1976). Therefore, if the miscreant does not know that the information is confidential, he or
she will not be liable for trading on that information, unless scienter could be established
through recklessness. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 n.12 (1980); Shapiro
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974); see also Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193 n.12 (reserving the question whether recklessness con-
stitutes scienter).
107. For further illustrations of such situations, see R. HAMILTON, CORPORATIONS, IN-
CLUDING, PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS 841 (2d ed. 1981); ALI FEDERAL SE-
CURITIES CODE § 1603, comment 3(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1980).
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3; see SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, .1980).
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976) prohibits false and misleading statements "in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security
holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation."
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rule attempts to prohibit virtually all who possess material inside infor-
mation concerning tender offer transactions from trading on that infor-
mation." 10 This rule, however, can extend only to tender offer
situations because section 14(e) is limited to such situations."' The
possibilities for the unauthorized trading use of inside information, on
the other hand, extend beyond those situations.
For example, a lawyer who has been retained by an individual to
file suit against a publicly-held company may take advantage of that
knowledge by selling stock of that company because he or she lacks the
requisite relationship to the issuer or its stockholders. An employee
who knows that his or her firm is about to award a lucrative contract to
a publicly-owned issuer may take advantage of this knowledge to
purchase securities of that issuer because he or she has no fiduciary
relationship to that company."12 In these situations, the person who is
profiting has knowingly used information that has been misappropri-
ated. The trader has not created or developed the information, and its
use was not authorized by a person who legitimately created it.
While it has been argued that improper trading on inside informa-
l 10. Rule 14e-3 provides: "If any person has taken a substantial step or steps to com-
mence, or has commenced, a tender offer (the 'offering person'), it shall constitute a fraudu-
lent, deceptive or manipulative act or practice within the meaning of section 14(e) of the Act
for any other person who is in possession of material information relating to such tender
offer which information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and which he knows
or has reason to know has been acquired directly or indirectly from: (1) The offering person,
(2) The issuer of the securities sought or to be sought by such tender offer, or (3) Any officer,
director, partner or employee or any other person acting on behalf of the offering person or
such issuer, to purchase or sell or cause to be purchased or sold any of such securities or any
securities convertible into or exchangeable for any such securities or any option or right to
obtain or to dispose of any of the foregoing securities, unless within a reasonable time prior
to any purchase or sale such information and its source are publicly disclosed by press re-
lease or otherwise."
11. One commentator has questioned whether rule 14e-3 is a valid exercise of the
SEC's rulemaking power. See Heller, supra note 3, at 541-45.
112. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note 30, at 952-53. If the employee is permitted to
trade on the inside information, the corporate employer should be able to trade on it because
it also lacked any confidential or fiduciary relationship with the other corporation or its
shareholders. Thus, the employee may have breached a fiduciary duty owed to the em-
ployer by appropriating a corporate opportunity. The trading employee, therefore, might be
subject to suit by the employer for breach of fiduciary duty, but under Chiarella could not be
sued by market traders unless a disclosure obligation to the market somehow arose from this
breach. See O'Connor & Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1187
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
For a discussion of "corporate opportunities," see generally H. HENN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 237 (2d ed. 1970); N. LATrIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 79 (2d ed.
1971). For a discussion of the ability of a corporation to trade in the securities of another
corporation on the basis of information received in the course of arm's-length contract nego-
tiations, see Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975).
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tion does not harm the market participants who trade, because they
presumably would have traded even if the "insider" were not in the
market,'" 3 there is at least a strong possibility that such conduct causes
harm to the markets by casting doubt upon their fairness and hon-
esty."l4 Because of this, such conduct should be deterred.
Because the rule of CMarella and its progeny does not accomplish
this deterrence to the fullest extent possible,' 5 as would be consistent
with congressional policy, it must be asked why the Supreme Court
adopted the rule. The Supreme Court adopted the Chiarella rule be-
cause, among other things, it determined that the "established doc-
trine" of precedent compelled this result.
116
No decision relied on by the Court in Chiarella' 7 actually held
that only those with a fiduciary or other confidential relationship to the
issuer and its security holders are subject to the insider trading pro-
scription."l 8 The Chiarella Court's apparent conclusion that the appli-
cation of the insider trading proscription of rule lOb-5 is so limited
cannot, therefore, have been compelled by precedent. Although the
Court indicated that its view of the application of the insider trading
proscription was consistent with and based on the "established doc-
trine" of these precedents,' 9 the assertion that the Chiarella doctrine
was "established" by the lower courts is unconvincing. Better reasons
justify the Court's result in Chiarella.
The Chiarella rule is supported, for example, by the language of
rule lOb-5,' 20 which prohibits fraud or deceit in connection with
purchases and sales of securities, and the language of section 10(b),'
2 1
the statutory authority for rule lOb-5, which authorizes the SEC to pro-
hibit the use of manipulative and deceptive devices or contrivances in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Arguably, the statute
and the rule cannot be interpreted to proscribe conduct that does not
113. See, ag., Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44 HARV. Bus. REV. 113 (1966).
114. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980); Barry, supra note 3, at
1352; Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 815-16; Marsh, Book Review, 66
MICH. L. REV. 1317, 1320 (1968).
115. See notes 99-112 & accompanying text supra.
116. 445 U.S. at 233.
117. See note 74 & accompanying text supra.
118. Although SEC v. Great American Indus., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 920 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 43-52 supra, comes close to such a
holding, that case did not define the ambit of the term "insiders." See notes 53-58 & accom-
panying text supra.
119. 445 U.S. at 230, 233.
120. See note I supra.
121. See note 2 supra.
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amount to fraud and deception, because they focus principally on
fraudulent and deceptive conduct.' 22 Under common law principles,
nondisclosure is fraudulent or deceptive only when it occurs in the face
of a duty to disclose, and a duty to disclose arises when there is a fiduci-
ary or confidential relationship between the buyer and the seller of the
securities. 23 The majority of the Court accepted this argument in
Chiarella.12 4 This argument, not the compelling and "established doc-
trine" of the precedents, probably led the Court to the Chiarella result.
Although this argument is plausible, it is not the only possible in-
terpretation of the scope of rule 1Ob-5 or section 10(b). The lower
courts and the SEC, whose precedents the Court found attractive and
compelling in Chiarella, had also established the doctrine that rule lOb-
5 and common law fraud are not identical and that their elements need
not be coextensive. 125 Thus, the Court could have interpreted "deceit"
and "fraud" without the limitations of the common law meaning of
these terms. 1
26
The Misappropriation Theory for Insider Trading Rules
If the insider trading proscriptions under section 10(b) and rule
122. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462
(1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); JENNINGS & MARSH, supra note
30, at 957-58.
123. See note 33 supra. A duty to disclose may, however, arise in some nonfiduciary
relationships. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (1976); Barry, supra note 3, at
1363-65; Langevoort, supra note 3, at 12 n.44.
124. See 445 U.S. at 227-28.
125. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerl. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969), discussed in notes 38-42 & accompanying text supra. In Texas Gulf
Sulphur, the court indicated that under rule lob-5 anyone in possession of inside informa-
tion had a duty to disclose it or refrain from trading, id. at 848, whereas common law fraud
principles would have applied this obligation only to fiduciaries. See note 33 supra. In
addition, the court suggested that the standard of culpability under rule lOb-5 could be
negligence in some circumstances, whereas under common law fraud principles scienter was
required. 1d. at 854-55.
Although the Texas Gulf Sulphur court's views on both of these points have since been
rejected by the Supreme Court, see Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980), Chiarella v. United
States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the case
demonstrates that lower courts were willing to view rule lOb-5 as extending beyond common
law fraud.
126. The Supreme Court itself has on occasion interpreted "fraud" broadly. Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), has been characterized as
holding that 'just plain stealing" is "fraud" for purposes of rule lob-5. JENNINGS & MARSH,
supra note 30, at 997-98. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963),
the Court construed "fraud" and "deceit" within the meaning of the Investment Advisers
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-1 to 806-21 (1976), broadly and remedially rather than in their "tech-
nical" sense.
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lOb-5 seek to maximize market honesty, while enhancing market fair-
ness by preserving incentives for legitimate analysis, 127 the following
insider trading proscription, proposed by Chief Justice Burger in his
Chiarella dissent, is appropriate: "[A] person who has misappropriated
nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose that informa-
tion or to refrain from trading." 128 Such a rule strikes a proper balance
between market fairness and market honesty and is consistent with the
results of the judicial and SEC decisions that the Court relied on in
Chiarella. 129
Promotion of Market Fairness and Honesty
If the proposed rule replaces the rule embraced by the majority in
Chiarella, the balance between market fairness and market honesty
would be enhanced. Unlike the Chiarella rule, which permits trading
on inside information by those who have not furthered market fair-
ness, 130 the proposed rule would permit insider trading only by those
who have contributed to the goal of market fairness by developing their
own informational advantage.' 3' The proposed rule would limit lawful
insider trading to those who have contributed to market fairness, be-
cause most "inside information," other than that which is the product
of a person's own effort, analysis, and thoughts, is misappropriated.132
Financial printers, eavesdroppers, office visitors, and burglars who
learn of a proposed tender offer, whether from their printing activities,
by overhearing a conversation, by glancing through a confidential doc-
ument, or by theft, have clearly misappropriated the information, be-
127. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
128. 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C. L., dissenting).
129. In In re Investors' Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633 (1971), the SEC appeared to
embrace a "misappropriation" test for determining who is an "insider" or a tippee of an
insider. Among the elements the SEC considered requisite for rule lOb-5 liability in the
proceeding against tippees was that they "know or have reason to know that [the informa-
tion] was non-public and had been obtained improperly by selective revelation or other-
wise." Id. at 641. The opinion noted: "Our formulation would clearly attach responsibility
in a situation where the recipient knew or had reason to know the information was obtained
by industrial espionage, commercial bribery or the like .... Our test would not attach
responsibility with respect to information which is obtained by general observation or analy-
sis." Id. at 641 n.18.
130. See notes 78-80 & accompanying text supra.
131. Presumably, one who has developed an informational advantage could choose to
share the benefits to be derived from that advantage with others. Therefore, authorized
"tippees" of one who could trade under the proposed rule should also be able to trade. See
Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, supra note 18, at 811-12; see also Barry, su~pra note 3, at
1373.
132. Tippees of persons who are proscribed from trading must disclose or refrain from
trading. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. at 230 n.12.
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cause in each case it was not intended for their use and benefit. 33
Similarly, the lawyer and the company employee who trade on infor-
mation received in the course of their employment have misappropri-
ated that information, because it was intended to be used by them only
for the benefit of their employer and not for their own personal benefit.
Yet, in each of these hypothetical cases, the Chiarella rule will permit
the malefactor to trade on this inside information without fear of suit
by market traders under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.134
The proposed rule, on the other hand, would subject these types of
insiders to the "disclose or refrain" rule of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.
Their hypothetical conduct is destructive of market honesty and not
conducive to the enhancement of market fairness, so it seems proper
that this type of conduct be deterred by the possibility of liability to
market traders.
Harmonization with Prior Law
The lower courts often have addressed situations in which the is-
suer or an officer, director, or substantial shareholder trades on inside
information. In such cases, the courts have found that the insider can
be sued by market participants under rule lOb-5.1
35
If the proposed rule were adopted, the result in these cases would
be the same. Information received by an officer, director, or controlling
stockholder in the course of the insider's relationship with the corpora-
tion is held for the benefit of the corporation, and not for personal ben-
efit; information received by the corporation is held for the benefit of
all shareholders.136 Therefore, it should be possible to view corporate
133. See Barry, supra note 3, at 1370-72.
134. The possibility of liability to others, however, remains. See note 100 supra.
135. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
136. This is true whether or not inside information is viewed as a corporate asset for
purposes of determining when, if ever, a nontrading shareholder may bring a derivative suit
under state law against an officer or director who trades on inside information. In Diamond
v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 298 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), the New York Court
of Appeals held that inside information is a corporate asset and that a derivative suit could
be maintained on behalf of the corporation by a nontrading shareholder against the officer
who misappropriated that asset. Id. at 498-99, 298 N.E. 2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817, 821-22 (2d Cir. 1973),
determined that the Florida courts would, if presented with the question, embrace the Dia-
mond rule and extend it to third parties who are involved in a common enterprise with
officers and directors to misuse corporate funds. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
flatly rejected the Diamond rule in Schein v. Chasen, 313 So. 2d 739, 746 (Fla. 1975), after
the United States Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit decision and certified the case
to the Florida Supreme Court. Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1974).
The Diamond approach was also rejected in Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186, 196 (7th Cir.
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information that is used for the personal benefit of an officer, a director,
or some of the shareholders 137 as having been "misappropriated" and,
if such is the case, the results in the traditional "insider" cases are con-
sistent with the misappropriation theory set forth in the proposed rule.
The courts have also treated as insiders a number of other catego-
ries of persons, such as underwriters, finders, and friendly acquisition
partners, 138 so that such persons are subject to the "disclose or refrain"
rule of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In such cases, the results should be
the same if the proposed rule were adopted. In each case the person
has knowingly traded, or caused others to trade, for personal gain on
information that was held for the benefit of another; thus, the malefac-
tor should be viewed as a misappropriator.
39
In addition, the courts have absolved from liability a number of
persons whose alleged transgression was trading upon an informational
1978), in which the Seventh Circuit determined that the Indiana courts would not follow
Diamond.
It seems that the rejection of Diamond is the proper result, because neither a nontrading
shareholder nor the corporation which he or she claims to represent in the derivative suit is
harmed by the nondisclosure of material, inside information. Once the inside information is
disclosed, the corporation and its remaining, nontrading shareholders get the benefit of it.
Only those who have sold during the period prior to the announcement of the information
have been harmed and only they should be able to sue, which they can do under rule lOb-5.
137. This would occur if a corporation possessing material inside information repur-
chased its own shares from some of its shareholders at a "bargain" price, thereby benefitting
the remaining shareholders. In American Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F.
Supp. 721, 743 (E.D. Va. 1980), the court held that corporate officers had no personal liabil-
ity under rule lOb-5 for failing to disclose material facts to the sellers from whom they re-
purchased shares on behalf of the corporate issuer. The court noted that insiders and
fiduciaries have a duty to disclose under Chiarella, but limited that duty to situations in
which the insider or fiduciary is trading for his or her own account. Id. at 741-44. The court
did, however, find the officers liable under § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for making affirmative
misrepresentations to the sellers. Id. at 744-47.
This result is consistent with the misappropriation theory previously discussed, because
the corporate officers had not appropriated the inside information for their own benefit. The
officers were using that information to benefit the corporation. The corporation itself, how-
ever, could be liable under rule lOb-5 for insider trading, even though its officers were not.
This result also would be consistent with the misappropriation theory. Because the informa-
tion on which the corporation traded was held for the benefit of all corporate shareholders,
the corporation, acting through its officers, misappropriated that information when it used it
to the disadvantage of the selling shareholders and to the advantage of the remaining ones.
138. See notes 53-58 & accompanying text supra.
139. Cf. Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, 524 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1975), in
which a defendant was absolved of liability to the corporate plaintiff under rule lOb-5 when
the "inside" information on which the defendant had traded was voluntarily disclosed by
the corporate plaintiff, without restriction on its use or confidentiality, in the course of arm's-
length negotiations between the defendant and the plaintiff. The result in Frigiiemp would
be the same under the proposed rule because the inside information there involved was
given to the defendant without restriction on its use; it was not misappropriated.
July 1982]
advantage consisting of their own plans for a company after its acquisi-
tion or their own analyses and views of a company's value. 140 These
results also are consistent with the "misappropriation" theory, although
the cases have been decided on the ground that the defendant is not an
insider rather than on the ground that the informational advantage was
not misappropriated. In these cases, the defendant's efforts or thoughts,
rather than misappropriation, produced the informational advantage,
and so the information may legitimately be employed under the pro-
posed rule without the threat of liability under section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5.141
Implementation of the Proposed Rules
Several possible means of adopting the proposed rule should be
examined. First, the Court might overrule 142 Chiarella and expressly
adopt the proposed rule. This is not likely, however, in light of the fact
that a majority of the Court declined the Chief Justice's proposal to
adopt this rule in Chiarella.143 Furthermore, the majority's basis for
140. See text accompanying notes 43-51 supra.
141. The misappropriation theory is also consistent with the application of the insider
trading proscription of rule lOb-5 to brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. The cases
usually have held that these persons, because of their fiduciary relationship to their clients,
must disclose to their clients any material information which they may have regarding the
securities that they are proposing to buy, sell, or recommend for the client. See, e.g., SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1977); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Barthe v. Rizzo, 384 F.
Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Such information could be information regarding the corpo-
rate issuer, which the broker-dealer or advisor might have developed through its research
department, or information regarding market conditions for the security. See Brudney,
supra note 19, at 349.
The requirement that brokers, dealers, and investment advisors disclose such informa-
tion to their clients is consistent with the misappropriation theory because information re-
specting an issuer that is developed or received by a broker, dealer, or investment advisor in
the course of its business, can be viewed as having been received for the benefit of its client.
Thus, if a broker or advisor uses the information for its own benefit, rather than disclosing it
to the client, the information arguably has been misappropriated.
142. Technically, any such action by the Court might not constitute an overruling, be-
cause of the narrow holding in Chiarella. See notes 71-80 & accompanying text supra.
143. Furthermore, the Court seems firmly committed to interpreting "fraud" and "de-
ceit" in common law terms for rule lob-5 purposes. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980);
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976). The Court's view of fraud and deceit was not always so circumscribed. See Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1965).
Of course, the Court could abandon the "established doctrine" embraced by it in
Chiarella in favor of the misappropriation theory espoused here. The Court's actual holding
was limited and neither accepted nor rejected the misappropriation theory. See notes 70-80
& accompanying text supra. In addition, Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
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the Chiarella rule indicates that the Court views section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 as being limited by common law fraud principles. 44 Thus, the
Court would probably not adopt the proposed rule.
Second, the SEC may revise rule lOb-5 or enact a new rule under
section 10(b), expressly prohibiting insider trading by misappropriators
of information. While the SEC appears disposed to take all reasonable
steps to combat this type of trading,145 the question remains whether
section 10(b) authorizes the SEC to prohibit conduct that would not
amount to fraud or deceit at common law. Chiarella and other authori-
ties cast doubt on the SEC's authority to do so.146 The SEC's response
to Chiarella-rule 14e-3-was grounded not on section 10(b) but on
section 14(e); the SEC felt that its rulemaking authority in this area was
clearer under section 14(e) than under section 10(b). 147 Accordingly,
the power of the SEC to enact the proposed rule under section 10(b) is
in doubt, and as the present rule is not broad enough to cover misap-
propriators who trade on inside information but who lack a fiduciary or
confidential relationship, the only proper avenue for enactment of the
proposed rule is through the Congress.
In an effort to end the uneven and unprincipled application of the
insider trading proscription, it is suggested that the following subsec-
tion (c) be added to section 10 of the Act:
Section 10. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange-
• . . (c) To purchase or sell or recommend the purchase or sale of
securities while in possession of material, undisclosed information re-
garding such securities or their issuer or affiliates of such issuer, in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors. Any rules adopted pursuant to this subsec-
tion (c) shall attempt to balance and bring about the objectives, set
forth in Section 2 of this Act, of fair and honest markets.
Under such clear statutory authority, the SEC could adopt the pro-
Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971), can be relied on as authority for the proposition that theft, or misap-
propriation, constitutes fraud for purposes of rule lOb-5. See JENNINGS & MARSH, supra
note 30, at 997-98; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 246 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
144. See notes 120-25 & accompanying text supra.
145. SEC Exchange Act Release 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980) (promulgating rule 14e-3). See
notes 108-11 & accompanying text supra.
146. See note 142 supra. For an argument that there is a common law duty to disclose
misappropriated information, see Barry, supra note 3, at 1362-63.
147. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 17,120 (Sept. 4, 1980).
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posed rule, which would then apply to all transactions, and not just to
those in the tender offer area now covered by rule 14e-3.1
48
Under the authority of this new statute, the SEC could adopt a
rule more restrictive than that proposed here.149 For this reason, the
last sentence of the proposed statute and its legislative history should
establish that only the use of misappropriated informational advan-
tages should be proscribed. Those informational advantages legiti-
mately derived from analysis of publicly available information may be
used by their creators and by authorized users.
Conclusion
For the past forty years, courts have applied rule lOb-5 to insider
trading transactions without considering the statutory policy behind the
rule. The Supreme Court has continued this approach in Chiarella.
The lower courts appear to be following Chiarella and determining the
scope of the insider trading rules on the basis of specified relationships
rather than statutory principles.
148. See notes 108-11 & accompanying text supra.
149. The possibility that the SEC might by rule preclude the use of informational ad-
vantages to a degree greater than that advocated by this Article is suggested by rule 14e-3,
which the Commission adopted in the wake of the Chiarella decision. See notes 108-11 &
accompanying text supra. This rule precludes the use by certain persons, prior to disclosure,
of material information respecting tender offers. While the rule does not preclude the use of
such information by the tender offeror itself, it does preclude the use of such information by,
among others, users who have been authorized by the tender offeror. See note 110 supra.
Furthermore, the SEC has suggested in the past that it may adopt a rule prohibiting the
tender offeror itself from commencing pre-tender, market purchases without disclosing its
intent to make a tender offer. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 15,548 (Feb. 5, 1979)
(proposed rule 14e-2(c)). Such a rule would go well beyond existing case law. See notes 43-
52 & accompanying text supra.
One of the incentives to spur investment analysis, which ultimately enhances market
fairness, is the possibility that the analyst, its clients, and other authorized users will reap the
benefits of that analysis by trading in the market before the results of the analysis generally
are known. See notes 18-22 & accompanying text supra. It seems inappropriate to prevent
the tender offeror or authorized users from trading until they have disclosed their informa-
tion respecting the tender. After all, the decision to launch the tender is the result of the
tender offeror's analysis of the current market situation and conclusion that the target com-
pany is undervalued. The offeror should be able to reap the benefits of this legitimate analy-
sis, enhancing the fairness of the market, without impairing its integrity or honesty, because
the information in question has not been misappropriated.
Thus, if section 10(b) is amended as proposed, the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-
(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), should also be amended appropriately to withdraw
the SEC's authority to prohibit preannouncement purchases by tender offerors and those.
authorized by the tender offeror to make such purchases. Such developments would return
the insider trading proscriptions to an evenhanded approach, consistent with the objectives
of Congress as set forth in section 2 of the Act.
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This approach leads to results inconsistent with the statutory pur-
pose of ensuring fair and honest markets. To achieve this statutory
purpose, Congress should augment the existing antifraud structure by
expressly authorizing the SEC to prohibit trading on "misappropri-
ated" information.

